Wednesday, September 24, 2014

Monday, September 22, 2014

CSAW 2014 Exploitation 400 - Saturn

[Participated with Segfault]
You have stolen the checking program for the CSAW Challenge-Response-Authentication-Protocol system. Unfortunately you forgot to grab the challenge-response keygen algorithm ( Can you still manage to bypass the secure system and read the flag?
The binary is an ELF 32-bit binary that accepted socket accepted input from stdin(and was running using xinetd or something similar). Looking at the binary we can see that there is a call to _fillChallengeResponse from the missing shared object file, that is probably setting two global variables(renamed as g1 and g2). 

The program then enters the following loop, where it reads a byte from the user, ands it against 0xF0, compares it against 0xA0, 0xE0 and 0x80 -- and performs actions accordingly.
Case 160:
We can see that our input char is and'd with 0x0F, left shifted twice(multiply by 4), added to the base address of g2 and 4 bytes are read back. Essentially, given an index, 4 bytes can be dereferenced starting at an offset from g2.
Case 128:
This function is interesting as it computes the computes the product of the contents of a global integer array and prints out the flag if the product is 1. Needless to say, each element of the global array is initialised to 0.
Case 224:
The input character is and'd with 0xF, left shifted by 2 and used as an index to deref addresses with g1 as the base. It then reads 4 bytes from the user and checks its contents against the deref address; if they match they set the globalarray[pos] = 1 where pos is calculated as inputchar & 0xF.
Armed with this information, we can try and write a python script that supplies values to trigger case 160, leaks values, triggers case 224, uses the leaked value to set a position in the global array to 1. Finally, we can trigger case 128 to read the key.
One could create a file with a _fillChallengeResponse function that could set g1 and g2, so that we could try debugging the saturn binary against our exploit.
The exploit can be found here.